Security War Room
ENGINE 01 / 06·
CONTINUOUS MONITORING · ALL ENGINES ACTIVE
Critical Attack Paths
0
↑ 3 since last scan
L2 Validated · Exploitable
0
AWS API proof confirmed
Financial Exposure
$0
↑ Est. breach cost
Detection Coverage
0%
↓ 66% of attacks invisible
Live Activity Feed
2m
CRITICAL
New IAM privilege escalation path — Internet → EC2 → S3 Crown Jewel discovered
4m
L2
L2 validation confirmed — lambda-processor can assume admin-role via iam:PassRole
7m
SIM
XseeCyber simulation complete — Path AP-0031 exploitable in 4 steps, 0 detections triggered
12m
FIXED
Remediation verified — SG ingress rule revoked, path AP-0028 permanently closed
15m
AI
Claude Engine — Executive risk summary generated for board · 3 critical paths
21m
SCAN
Scan #1,847 complete — 847 assets indexed · 12 new findings · 4 validated
✦
Claude Engine
AI SECURITY ANALYST · ACTIVE
I've identified 4 exploitable attack paths requiring immediate attention. Path AP-0031 leads directly to your customer PII database via a validated IAM privilege escalation chain. Estimated breach probability: 94%. A single IAM policy change closes 3 paths simultaneously.
AP-0031 · Internet → EC2 → IAM → S3-PII · CRITICAL
AP-0029 · Lambda → AssumeRole → Admin → All Resources · CRITICAL
AP-0033 · NHI token exposed in EC2 instance metadata · HIGH
AP-0034 · Public S3 + unencrypted secrets → Account takeover · HIGH
Attack Intelligence Graph
ENGINE 02 / 06·
L1 GRAPH SIMULATION · 847 NODES · 2,341 EDGES · 12 CRITICAL PATHS
AI Verdict · AP-0031
Path is immediately exploitable. EC2 has iam:PassRole to admin-role. L2 confirmed via SimulatePrincipalPolicy.
94%
CONF.
Path Details
Path IDAP-0031
Targets3://acme-pii
Exposure$1.8M
L2 StatusCONFIRMED
Cut Points2 identified
MITRE ATT&CK
T1190 · Exploit Public App
T1548 · Elevation Control
T1530 · Cloud Storage Data
L2 Attack Path Validation
ENGINE 03 / 06·
LIVE AWS API VALIDATION · PATH AP-0031 · REAL EVIDENCE · NOT THEORETICAL
Live AWS API Evidence — SimulatePrincipalPolicy
// AWS IAM · SimulatePrincipalPolicy
// Captured: 2026-04-05T09:47:22Z · us-east-1
{
"EvaluationResults": [{
"EvalActionName": "iam:PassRole",
"EvalDecision": "allowed",
"EvalResourceName": "arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/admin-role",
"MatchedStatements": [{
"SourcePolicyId": "ec2-processor-policy",
"StartPosition": { "Line": 14 }
}]
},{
"EvalActionName": "s3:GetObject",
"EvalDecision": "allowed",
"EvalResourceName": "arn:aws:s3:::acme-customer-pii/*"
}],
"IsTruncated": false
}
Security Group — Public Ingress Confirmed
// DescribeSecurityGroups · sg-0a1b2c3d4e5f
{
"GroupId": "sg-0a1b2c3d4e5f",
"GroupName": "ec2-processor-sg",
"IpPermissions": [{
"IpProtocol": "tcp",
"FromPort": 443, "ToPort": 443,
"IpRanges": [{
"CidrIp": "0.0.0.0/0",
"Description": "public-access"
}]
}]
}
Validation Chain · 5 of 5 Steps
✓
Public Internet Access Confirmed
SG allows 0.0.0.0/0 on port 443 · EC2 public IP: 54.23.11.87
✓
IAM PassRole Permission Verified
SimulatePrincipalPolicy → ALLOWED · iam:PassRole on admin-role
✗
No Permission Boundary Detected
No boundary on ec2-processor-role · Escalation unconstrained
✓
Crown Jewel S3 Access Confirmed
s3:GetObject ALLOWED · 847,293 PII records directly accessible
!
No CloudTrail Alert Configured
iam:PassRole calls not alerting · Attack invisible to your team
Why Wiz can't show you this
Wiz uses an agentless graph model — it cannot call SimulatePrincipalPolicy, validate real AWS permissions, or generate a signed evidence package. It shows theoretical paths, not proof.
XSEE called 3 live AWS APIs and returned cryptographically signed evidence. This is the difference between a finding and a proof.
XSEE called 3 live AWS APIs and returned cryptographically signed evidence. This is the difference between a finding and a proof.
Smart Remediation Engine
ENGINE 05 / 06·
OPTIMAL CUT-POINT ANALYSIS · PATH AP-0031 · ONE CLICK TO FIX
Cut-Point Analysis — Minimum Change, Maximum Impact
✂ CUT-1 kills 3 critical paths simultaneously
Single IAM change · zero service impact
Auto-Generated Terraform Fix
# Remove iam:PassRole from ec2-processor-role
# Closes: AP-0031, AP-0032, AP-0035
resource "aws_iam_policy" "ec2_processor_restricted" {
name = "ec2-processor-policy-v2"
policy = jsonencode({
Version = "2012-10-17"
Statement = [{
Effect = "Allow"
Action = ["s3:GetObject", "logs:PutLogEvents"]
# iam:PassRole REMOVED ← entire fix in one line
Resource = "*"
}]
})
}
Fix Options · Ranked by Impact / Effort
Remove iam:PassRole Permission
Delete iam:PassRole from ec2-processor-policy. Kills AP-0031, AP-0032, AP-0035 in one change. Zero service impact. Reversible in seconds.
Risk −94%Effort: Low3 paths closedTime: 2 min
Enforce IMDSv2 on EC2 Instance
Block IMDSv1 metadata access. Kills the credential extraction step. Requires a brief instance restart.
Risk −60%Effort: Low2 paths closed
Attach IAM Permission Boundary
Limit maximum permissions of ec2-processor-role. Defense-in-depth.
Risk −40%Effort: Med1 path closed
REMEDIATION AGENT READY · AWAITING HUMAN APPROVAL
One click. Agent applies via AWS SDK → L2 re-validates → certificate generated.
Rollback available 24h if verification fails.
Rollback available 24h if verification fails.
XseeCyber L3 Simulation
ENGINE 04 / 06·
RUNTIME EXPLOIT SIMULATION · PATH AP-0031 · SAFE MODE · ZERO PROD IMPACT
1×
2×
5×
↺ Replay
Safe sandbox · no prod impact
xseecyber-agent · v2.4.1 · path:AP-0031 · simulation-mode:safe
Kill Chain Timeline
1
T+00:00
Reconnaissance
Port scan · nginx/1.24.0 fingerprint · CVE-2023-44487 matched
2
T+02:11
Initial Access
HTTP/2 exploit · IMDSv1 abuse · EC2 credentials from metadata
3
T+04:47
Privilege Escalation
iam:PassRole → admin-role assumed · Full account control
4
T+08:33
Data Exfiltration
847K PII records · S3 bulk GetObject · 0 detections fired
Simulation Result
EXPLOIT SUCCEEDED
Stages: 4 / 4 complete
✗ IMDSv2 not enforced
✗ iam:PassRole not monitored
✗ S3 logging disabled
✓ 3 detection rules auto-generated
Breach Prevention Certificate
ENGINE 06 / 06·
AUTONOMOUS LOOP COMPLETE · ALL PATHS CLOSED · BOARD-READY PDF GENERATED
XSEE
XSEE
BREACH PREVENTION CERTIFICATE · BOARD EDITION
3 Critical Attack
Paths Eliminated.
Paths Eliminated.
Acme Corp · AWS Account 123456789012 · April 5, 2026
3
Paths Closed
$2.4M
Risk Eliminated
94
Security Score
XSEE validated, simulated, and verified closure of all critical attack paths. Each fix was applied by the XSEE Remediation Agent following explicit human approval, then independently verified via L2 live AWS API re-validation. The attack paths listed above no longer exist in the customer environment. This certificate is cryptographically signed and tamper-evident.
✓ Autonomous Loop Complete
✓Discover847 assets · 12 paths
✓L1 Graph Validate4 exploitable
✓L2 ProveAWS API evidence
✓PrioritizeCut-points ranked
◎Human Approved1 click · 4 seconds
✓Fix AppliedAWS SDK · IAM updated
✓L3 SimulatePost-fix confirmed clean
✓VerifyL2 re-run · path closed
✓CertifyBoard PDF signed
The XSEE Difference
"You might have a problem here. We ranked it critical."
← What Wiz delivers
"This was exploitable. We proved it. We fixed it. Here's the signed certificate."
← What XSEE delivers
Next scan: tomorrow 09:00 UTC
Auto-alert: admin@acme.io
Certificate ID: XSEE-2026-04-05-AP0031
Auto-alert: admin@acme.io
Certificate ID: XSEE-2026-04-05-AP0031